ICRP publication 82 on protection against prolonged exposure - application in accident situations by Jensen, Per Hedemann
 
 
General rights 
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright 
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
 Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
 You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
 You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal 
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
  
 
   
 
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Oct 25, 2019
ICRP publication 82 on protection against prolonged exposure - application in accident
situations
Jensen, Per Hedemann
Publication date:
2002
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link back to DTU Orbit
Citation (APA):
Jensen, P. H. (2002). ICRP publication 82 on protection against prolonged exposure - application in accident
situations. Abstract from 13th Ordinary meeting of the Nordic Society for Radiation Protection, Åbo, Finland.
RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION IN THE 2000s - THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Nordic Society for Radiation Protection, 13th Ordinary Meeting, Turku, Finland, 25 - 29 August 2002 
 
 
 
ICRP PUBLICATION 82 ON PROTECTION AGAINST PROLONGED 
EXPOSURE - APPLICATION IN ACCIDENT SITUATIONS 
 
PER HEDEMANN JENSEN 
RISØ NATIONAL LABORATORY 
DK-4000 ROSKILDE, DENMARK 
 
1 Introduction 
In the past 15 years, two events have occurred that cover a conceivable range of emergencies 
involving extensive post-emergency phase response, namely the Chernobyl and Goiânia acci-
dents. Large amounts of 137Cs were released to the environment during these accidents, leading 
to a prolonged or quasi-prolonged exposure of the affected populations. The experience gained 
from these accidents and others have revealed that there is a need for an updated and fully inte-
grated system of guidance on implementation of countermeasures. A revised system must have 
a sound technical basis but must also be understandable, explainable and acceptable to the pub-
lic and the decision-makers. Once all protective actions have been undertaken, the situation 
should be considered ‘normal’ again with no further restriction being imposed. Therefore a 
common language explanation should be developed for the public and public officials that 
clearly state the risks of radiation exposure and what actions are appropriate and inappropriate, 
and what is “safe”. The concepts of “safe” and “return to normality” should be developed to-
gether with intervention criteria, disengaged from the linear non-threshold risk hypothesis. 
Within this context, the application of the recommendations in ICRP Publication 82 for applica-
tion in post-accident situations is briefly summarized with reference to observations and lessons 
learned from the Chernobyl and Goiânia accidents. 
2 Radiation protection in prolonged exposure situations 
ICRP has recently published guidance on protection of the public against prolonged radiation 
exposure1. Prolonged exposures are adventitiously and persistently incurred by the public over 
long periods of time. They are incidental to situations in which members of the public may find 
themselves. The annual doses associated with prolonged exposures are more or less constant or 
decreases slowly over the years. Generic reference levels for intervention in prolonged exposure 
situations, expressed in terms of existing annual dose, are recommended by the ICRP; these lev-
els should be viewed as a consequential derivation from the basic ICRP principles of radiologi-
cal protection for intervention and as complementary, rather than alternative, to those principles. 
Their use should not preclude the application of these basic principles to any dose component of 
the existing annual dose that is controllable, particularly if it is a dominant component. 
2.1 Sources of prolonged exposure 
Situations of prolonged exposure of the public include the prolonged background exposure and 
the exposure from human-made radiation sources. The prolonged background exposure varies 
with the geographical and geological characteristics but also with features associated with hu-
man development. The human-made radiation sources causing prolonged exposure would arise 
from a number of human activities associated with the development of society. 
                                                 
1 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Protection of the Public in Situations 
of Prolonged Radiation Exposure. Publication No. 82, Pergamon Press, Oxford, New York (2000). 
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 The natural sources, which are responsible for the prolonged exposure, are the external 
cosmic radiation, the radionuclides produced by cosmic rays in the atmosphere (e.g. 14C and 
3H), and the radionuclides of uranium and thorium in the earth's crust. The exposure pathways 
include external exposure and inhalation and ingestion of radionuclides in air, food and water. 
 Prolonged exposures of the public from human activities usually result from releases of 
long-lived radionuclides into the environment. Residues containing long-lived radionuclides 
from past human activities that were not adequately controlled are one example. Others are cur-
rent practices, some past industrial applications, especially mineral extraction, military opera-
tions and nuclear or radiological accidents. Figure 1 presents a schematic illustration of various 
sources of prolonged exposure. 
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Figure 1. Schematic presentation of various sources of prolonged exposure. They include a 
number of natural and artificial sources. The sum of exposures to the sources present in a hu-
man habitat results in an existing annual exposure to the individuals living there. 
The operation of practices may leave long-lived radioactive residues in the environment, result-
ing in situations of prolonged exposure. Practices may also generate prolonged exposure situa-
tions due to the disposal of radioactive wastes. Radioactive residues from practices can either 
result from normal discharges to the environment or remain on and around the site of a practice 
after the cessation of the practice and decommissioning of its installations. 
Intervention situations involving prolonged exposure are of various types. In all cases, 
decisions have to be taken on whether and how to intervene in order to reduce these exposures 
and, eventually, on whether and when to discontinue protective actions. The classical interven-
tion situation is where people are already incurring exposures attributable to an identifiable 
event relatively close in time, e.g., a nuclear or radiological accident. Another type is, for exam-
ple, exposures to natural sources and to radioactive residues that cannot be linked to any particu-
lar originating cause or where the link to the cause has weakened over time. 
2.2 Reference levels for intervention in prolonged exposure situations 
In the ICRP 82 the relevant dosimetric quantity for controlling prolonged exposures is the an-
nual effective dose. This is the sum of the time integral, over a year, of the effective dose rate 
due to external irradiation caused by the prolonged exposure situation and the committed effec-
tive dose due to internal contamination caused by all intakes, during that year, of the long-lived 
radionuclides (and their short-lived progeny) involved in the situation. A subsidiary quantity 
used within the context of prolonged exposure is the existing annual dose caused by all persist-
ing sources of prolonged exposure in a given situation. Other subsidiary quantities are the addi-
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tional annual dose caused by practices and the averted annual dose precluded by an interven-
tion. 
The existing annual dose can conceptually be used to establish generic reference levels 
for intervention. However, such quantity should be used with caution. It is made up of all the 
existing and persisting annual doses incurred by individuals and, therefore, it is constituted by 
many different components of prolonged exposure. These include external exposure to long-
lived radionuclides (and their progeny) in soils, strata, and building materials (including expo-
sure to radon and other radionuclides in the ambient), internal exposure due to the incorporation 
of those radionuclides into the body as a result of inhalation of resuspended materials, and in-
gestion of contaminated foodstuffs. 
There is not a single measure that can be used to determine the value of the existing an-
nual dose, as any of its components may require different assessment methodologies. Thus, 
there may be practical problems in implementing regulatory standards expressed in terms of the 
existing annual dose. Because of these difficulties, the ICRP 82 has given preference to specific 
reference levels based on avertable annual doses of given components, rather than to generic 
reference levels based on existing annual doses. The ICRP 82 recommends that: 
(a) An existing annual dose approaching about 10 mSv may be used as a generic reference 
level below which intervention is not likely to be justifiable for some prolonged exposure 
situations. 
(b) Below the level of existing annual dose for which intervention is not likely to be justifi-
able, protective actions to reduce a dominant component of the existing annual dose are 
still optional and might be justifiable. In such cases, action levels specific to particular 
components can be established on the basis of appropriate fractions of the recom-
mended generic reference level. 
(c) Moreover, above the level of existing annual dose for which intervention is not likely to 
be justifiable, intervention may possibly be necessary and its justification should be con-
sidered on a case-by-case basis as appropriate. 
(d) Situations in which the annual (equivalent) dose thresholds for deterministic effects in 
relevant organs could be exceeded should require intervention. 
(e) An existing annual dose rising towards 100 mSv will almost always justify intervention 
and may be used as a generic reference level for establishing protective actions under 
nearly any conceivable circumstance. 
In general, ICRP concludes that the use of generic reference levels should not encourage a 
‘trade-off’ of protective actions among the various components of the existing annual dose. In 
this regard the ICRP considers that a low level of existing annual dose does not necessarily im-
ply that protective actions should not be applied to any of its components; and, conversely, a 
high level of existing annual dose does not necessarily require intervention. Should intervention 
be considered justifiable, the form, scale and duration of the protective actions should be opti-
mised. 
2.3 ICRP 82 generic reference levels in perspective 
The identification of existing annual doses low enough to make intervention usually not to be 
expected, and not likely to be justifiable, is not simple and certainly not straightforward. For 
perspective purposes, it is helpful to use the ‘natural’ existing annual doses experienced in many 
parts of the world. The global average ‘natural’ dose is 2.4 mSv/a, but many large populations 
have lived for years in areas of the world experiencing typically elevated doses of up to around 10 
mSv/a, with some populations even incurring doses above 100 mSv/a. In many of the places ex-
periencing high levels of background radiation, the dominant component of exposure is that to the 
gas radon in dwellings; in other situations, the exposure is mainly caused by other gamma-emitting 
radionuclides, such as radium in soil and water. 
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With some exception, intervention has rarely, if ever, been undertaken to reduce the typically 
elevated ‘natural’ background doses of about 10 mSv/a. Moreover, only occasionally have protec-
tive actions been implemented to reduce higher ‘natural’ background doses, even when these 
doses were controllable. This might suggest that competent authorities have considered these 
levels as being unlikely to trigger any intervention in those situations. 
Moreover, the ICRP considers that a high level of existing annual dose - e.g., due to high 
natural background levels - should not justify per se a particular component of annual dose - e.g., 
a high level of annual dose attributable to long-lived radioactive residues. This should always be 
restricted following the principles of the System of Radiological Protection for intervention. 
However, as the expected radiation health effects depend on the dose received and not on the 
source origin, the ICRP also considers that the typically elevated levels of existing annual doses 
from ‘natural’ sources, which have not triggered any protective action, may provide a useful in-
sight into decisions related to intervention. 
Further insight on sufficiently low levels of existing annual doses can be obtained from 
earlier recommendations given in ICRP Publication 632 and in ICRP Publication 653. In these 
publications a number of intervention situations including some involving prolonged exposure 
were addressed. Specific reference levels below which any intervention or action is unlikely to 
be taken in various situations were here recommended, suggesting levels ranging from a few to 
a few tens of mSv for a dominant single component of the existing annual dose. Such interven-
tion and action levels have been generally incorporated into international standards4 and some 
national regulations. Again, this suggests that governmental authorities have considered the rec-
ommended levels (of around 10 mSv/a) as being unlikely to trigger intervention. 
3 Response to nuclear or radiological emergencies - principles and ex-
perience 
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) has indicated that its basic 
framework for radiological protection is intended to prevent the occurrence of deterministic ef-
fects, by keeping doses below the relevant thresholds, and to ensure that all reasonable steps are 
taken to reduce the induction of stochastic effects. Although the ICRP policy for radiation pro-
tection has evolved over the years, its main objective has remained basically unchanged. It was 
formulated in the latest recommendations from ICRP (Publication 60) as: The primary aim of 
radiological protection is to provide an appropriate standard of protection for man without un-
duly limiting the beneficial practices giving rise to radiation exposure. The ICRP policy is also 
to supplement the available scientific knowledge by value judgements about the relative impor-
tance of different kinds of risk and about the balancing of risks and benefits. 
3.1 Protection principles in a nuclear or radiological emergency 
The System of Radiological Protection makes a distinction between source-related protection - 
which is concerned with the exposures of individuals resulting from a single source - and indi-
vidual-related protection - which is concerned with the exposure of a single, individual from 
many sources. Provided that the individual doses are well below the threshold for deterministic 
effects, the contribution to an individual dose from a single source has an effect that is inde-
pendent of the doses from other sources. For many purposes, each source, or group of sources, 
can then be treated on its own. 
                                                 
2 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Principles for Intervention for Protec-
tion of the Public in a Radiological Emergency. Publication 63, Pergamon Press, Oxford, New York, Seoul, Tokyo 
(1993). 
3 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Protection Against Radon-222 at 
Home and at Work. Publication 65, Pergamon Press, Oxford, (1993). 
4 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, International Basic Safety Standards for Protection Against 
Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. Safety Series No. 115, Vienna (1996). 
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 Source-related assessments make it possible to judge whether a practice or intervention is 
likely to bring benefits sufficient to outweigh any disadvantages and whether all reasonable 
steps have been taken to reduce the radiation exposures that a source will cause. They thus fa-
cilitate the justification of practices and interventions and the optimisation of protection at the 
source level. Source-related assessments take account of the magnitude (increase or decrease) of 
the doses attributable to the assessed source, and of the number of individuals exposed, but not 
of the influence on individuals of other exposure sources. 
 The system of radiological protection for intervention situations is based on the following 
general principles of justification and optimisation: 
(a) All possible efforts should be made to prevent deterministic effects. 
(b) The intervention should be justified, in the sense that introduction of the protective meas-
ure should achieve more good than harm. 
(c) The levels at which the intervention is introduced and at which it is later withdrawn 
should be optimised, so that the protective measure will produce a maximum net benefit. 
Dose limits used in the radiation protection system for practices do not apply in the case of inter-
vention, for which intervention levels in terms of avertable dose should be applied. 
3.2 Some reflections and lessons from past emergencies 
Radiation emergencies in the past have demonstrated that immediately after the emergency 
phase of the response, there will be immense pressure from the public, public officials and the 
media to act to correct the problem and return the situation to normal. Without prior arrange-
ments, public officials, when under intense pressure to restore the situation to normal, may take 
highly visible actions even if these are only minimally effective or even counterproductive. Dur-
ing the response to Chernobyl many unjustified efforts were carried out because of this pressure, 
such as decontamination of areas (e.g. Pripyat) that were evacuated and never resettled. 
 The Chernobyl and Goiânia accidents demonstrated that public officials make decisions 
concerning implementation of countermeasures affecting the public during the post-emergency 
phase of a radiation emergency. These officials were not radiation specialists and they made 
their decisions on the basis of their understanding of both the radiological risk and of societal 
and political concerns. This was recognized by the ICRP1 when it recommended that guidance 
for taking post-emergency countermeasures based on scientific consideration of radiation pro-
tection should serve as an input into the wider decision-making process. It is important that the 
decision-maker understands the guidance for dealing with the radiological risk and be able to 
explain it to the public and the stakeholders for it to be useful as a decision-aiding tool. Assur-
ance that the actions being taken will guarantee the “safety” of the affected populations should 
therefore be elaborated by the radiation protection community, disengaged from the linear non-
threshold (LNT) risk hypothesis. 
 Following radiation emergencies the public took inappropriate and in some cases harmful 
action due to fear and misunderstanding concerning radiation risks and how to reduce them (e.g. 
refusing to buy products from the area, refusing to sell airline tickets to people from the area, 
having abortions due to a fear of radiation induced effects, and refusing to provide medical 
treatment to victims). These fears were in part due to the use of the LNT hypothesis by unoffi-
cial sources, the use of cryptic technical terms and the reluctance of technical experts to provide 
the definitive guidance needed and wanted by the pubic. Therefore, the LNT hypothesis should 
be reconsidered as basis for decisions on countermeasures. 
 Experience shows that international guidance does not address many post-emergency 
countermeasures that should be implemented, in part, based on radiation protection principles 
and insights. These include personal monitoring and decontamination, decontamination of prop-
erty, release of contaminated property for use, initial medical screening, long-term medical fol-
low-up, contaminated non-food products, and termination of countermeasures (‘return to nor-
mality’). 
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The ICRP1 and others5 have pointed out that it is impossible to anticipate or address fac-
tors not directly related to radiation protection principles when developing radiation protection 
guidance. Attempting to consider other factors or anticipate what would be acceptable to the 
public would only undermine the technical foundation of the recommendations, making them 
difficult to apply consistently, adjust or explain. It is the role of the radiation protection expert 
to give the best professional advice, even if the decision-maker, bowing to the pressure of po-
litical or public opinion, subsequently ignores it. Therefore, international guidance on interven-
tions after an accident should be based solely on radiation protection considerations. 
4 Applying ICRP 82 in an integrated framework of emergency response 
A fully integrated system for implementation of countermeasures must have a sound technical 
basis but must also be understandable, explainable and acceptable to the public and to decision-
makers. The essence of the guidance is that it must do more good than harm (be justified) and 
assure the public that they are safe. The ICRP 82 recommendations were developed for pro-
longed exposure situations, and they can be used as basis for an integrated system of radiologi-
cal protection in emergency situations with special emphasis on the radiation protection of 
populations affected by nuclear accidents (e.g. Kyshtyhm, Chernobyl) or radiological accidents 
(e.g. Goiânia) in the post-emergency phase. 
 The radiation protection strategy for a population affected by a nuclear or radiological 
accident should first of all do everything possible to avoid serious deterministic effects and 
should thereafter implement protective actions with the aim of averting doses to the population 
to a safe level. Once all required protective actions have been undertaken, the situation should 
be considered ‘normal’ again with no further restriction being imposed. 
POSSIBLE HEALTH EFFECTS
Deterministic effects possible
Known to be safe - many areas
around the world at this level - 
no effects
Detectable increase in cancer
incidence rate if large
populations are exposed 
If received in short period
maybe increase in thyroid
cancer in children and
fetal effects
May be safe - a few areas
around the world at this
level - no known effects
No identifiable health effects
below this dose level
EFFECTIVE DOSE
1000 mSv/a
100 mSv/a
10 mSv/a
“Safe levels of dose”
(safe living)
[mSv per unit time]
100 mSv in days
1000 mGy in days
ORGAN DOSE
[mGy per unit time]
100 mGy in days
100 mGy/a
“Safe levels of dose”
(safe living)
1000 mGy/a
RESPONSE ACTIONS
> 10 mSv in days:
Urgent protective
measures
> 1000 mGy in days:
Precautionary
measures
> 10 mSv/a:
Long-term protective
measures
< 10 mSv/a:
No protective actions
 
Figure 2. Protection strategy following a nuclear or radiological accident. At very high levels 
of individual dose preventive and urgent protective actions should be implemented to prevent 
deterministic effects and high probabilities of stochastic effects. At lower individual dose levels 
countermeasures should be implemented to avert doses to the affected population to reduce the 
stochastic effects and to restrict the residual individual dose level to a safe level. This level can 
be regarded as level for safe living conditions after a protective measure has been lifted (or con-
sidered but not implemented). 
                                                 
5 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Restoration of Environments with Radioactive Residues. Pro-
ceedings of an International Symposium, Arlington, Virginia, USA, 29 November - 3 December 1999. IAEA, Vienna 
(2000). 
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Figure 2 illustrates the protection strategy after a nuclear or radiological accident: all effort 
should be done to avoid deterministic effects, and the reduction in expected stochastic effects 
should be based on optimized intervention and action levels to achieve a safe level, which can 
be defined as: 
(1) From a radiation protection point of view “safe” means that population or critical sub-
groups will not receive a total annual dose leading to identifiable adverse health effects; 
“safe” does, however, not mean zero risk. 
(2) Normal living conditions means that members of the public can live without any signifi-
cant disrupting restrictions. Safe conditions are when people are living in normal living 
conditions or are following restrictions associated with radiation exposure. 
(3) A total annual effective dose of about 10 mSv can be used as a reference level for safe 
living conditions. However, if a process of justification and optimization results in dif-
ferent (higher or lower) dose levels, these should be applied in that given situation. 
The system of radiological protection for interventions can be rephrased based on the following 
principles: 
(a) Actions to avoid serious deterministic effects should almost always be undertaken 
(b) Protective and remedial actions should be based on justified and optimised specific in-
tervention levels and action levels 
(c) The population affected by a nuclear or radiological accident should be safe after pro-
tective and remedial actions have been implemented (individual effective doses < 10 
mSv/a) 
The rephrased system of radiological protection for interventions in emergency situations is il-
lustrated in Figure 3. 
Typically elevated
‘NATURAL’ BACKGROUND
Very high
Global average
GENERIC REFERENCE
LEVELS
Intervention almost
always justifiable
Intervention may
be necessary
Intervention unlikely
to be justifiable
AVERTABLE 
EFFECTIVE DOSE
[mSv]
> 10 per day in days
(sheltering/evacuation)
> 10 per month in months
(temporary relocation)
> 10 per year in lifetime
(permanent resettlement)
< 10 per year permanently
(food countermeasures,
cleanup, etc. if justified)
EXISTING ANNUAL
EFFECTIVE DOSE
[mSv]
100
2.4
10
(    1000 mSv in a lifetime)
(    200 mSv in a lifetime)
(    10 Sv in a lifetime)
Not safe
Safe
 
Figure 3. Schematic representation of the system of protection in emergency situations with an 
upper bound of the generic intervention levels of existing dose vis a vis the specific intervention 
levels of avertable dose. The specific intervention and action levels have been set to give an op-
timum reduction in individual doses. The exposure level to be compared with the interven-
tion/action levels is the average individual dose in the critical group. 
An annual effective dose of about 10 mSv (3 - 5 % additional average lifetime risk of fatal cancer if 
lifetime is taken to be 60 - 100 years) represents an upper bound on residual annual dose dividing 
exposure situations into two “classes”. Situations with annual effective doses to the critical group 
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above this level would normally not be considered as normal. In cases where the residual dose is 
characterized as “normal” it would henceforth be considered “background”. In addition, a high 
level of existing annual dose should not preclude the introduction of a new practice, as a prac-
tice is controlled through the additional annual dose attributable to the practice rather than 
through the existing annual dose. 
5 Conclusions 
The Chernobyl and Goiânia accidents clearly demonstrated the need for recommendations on 
‘normal’ or ‘safe’ living conditions in post-accident management. The USSR lacked criteria for 
implementation of countermeasures and return to normality (ending countermeasures) at the 
time of the Chernobyl emergency. In the years after the Chernobyl accident, the former Soviet 
Union - due to public pressure - adopted criteria for resettlement and other countermeasures that 
were not founded on established radiation protection principles. In the opinion of many radia-
tion protection professionals, the criteria were not justified and probably have done more harm 
that good. During the response at Goiânia, it was very difficult to set operational levels for post-
emergency intervention that were consistent with internationally accepted scientific principles 
because of time constraints and political pressure. This resulted in the use of the dose limit for 
practices as a basis for intervention and consequently in protective actions, generation of con-
taminated waste and decontamination and disposal costs that did not appear to be justified on 
radiation protection grounds. 
The recommendations in ICRP Publication 82 were developed to fill a long experienced 
gap with regards to radiation protection against exposure from long-lived radionuclides in the 
environment, including those originating from radiological or nuclear accident. The recommen-
dations are based on objective assessments of the health risks associated with prolonged expo-
sure levels and on radiological protection attributes of various exposure situations. Typically 
elevated prolonged exposures due to natural radiation sources are usually ignored by society, 
while relatively minor prolonged exposures to artificial long-lived radioactive residues are a 
cause of concern and sometimes prompt actions that are unnecessary in a radiological protection 
sense. This reality of social and political attributes, unrelated to radiological protection, usually 
influences the final decision on the level of protection against prolonged exposure. Therefore, 
while ICRP 82 should be seen as a provider of decision-aiding recommendations mainly based 
on scientific considerations on radiological protection, the outcome of its advice will be ex-
pected to serve as input to a usually wider decision-making process. 
Based on the radiation protection recommendations in ICRP 82 a dose level of 10 mSv 
per annum can be used as a reference level for ‘safe living conditions’ or ‘return to normality’ 
after protective measures have been lifted (or considered but not implemented). The definition of 
‘safe’ in the context of residual radiation exposure of population groups is that no radiation in-
duced adverse health effects can be observed, and, equally important, that the residual risk for 
developing such health effects is low for the affected individuals. 
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